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The purpose of this research is to determine if pricing
strategy and pricing stability for products in the defense
aerospace industry can be predicted based on a firm's
financial condition. The sample for this research includes
17 contractors and 52 missile and aircraft programs.
Two separate issues are addressed. The first issue
concerns the relationship between financial condition and
contractor pricing strategy. The second concerns the
relationship between organizational slack and pricing
stability.
The overall findings are:
) I That a limited amount of variation in pricing strategy
can be explained through the use of a linear
regression model using financial ratios. (vj.
J
2) That no apparent relationship exists between organiza-
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Acquiring major weapon systems is a complex and
challenging process, one that has been subjected to
considerable study over several decades. Criticisms of
the process in the Department of Defense have focused on
the acquisitions taking too long, costing too much, and
resulting in operational systems that do not perform as
expected. [Ref. 1:p. 1]
In addition, major acquisitions are under the watchful
eye of Congress and the American public, subject to the
strict regulations and procedures, and are of such a high
dollar value that they have become highly political between
the government and prospective contractors.
Contracting is big business. On an annual basis an
average of 900 contracts of all sizes, nearly three for
every day of the year, is handled by each of the DOD's
13,000 contracting officers. Everything from light bulbs to
multi-million dollar jet fighters are purchased through
these contracts. (Ref. 2:p. 50] The acquisition process is
growing by leaps and bounds but has been racked by
procurement scandals in recent years due to overpriced
ashtrays, gold-plated hammers and elaborate sofas. These
scandals have made procurement everyone's business and
vaulted the DOD contracting process to the front page.
The defense procurement market is not classically
competitive because of its monopsonistic buyer, DOD, and
its oligopolistic prime contractors. In some cases sole
source procurements have led to the creation of a
7
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monopolistic seller and bilateral monopoly market
structure. [Ref. 3:p. 7]
The absence of competition or the Pentagon's self-exemption
from market forces, according to fn'i-er Navy Secretary John
Lehman,
. . is at the root of many of our procurement ills. The
bureaucrat finds the environment comfortable because
nobody gets in trouble or fails. Defense contractors make
a return on equity double that of non-defense companies.
Only the taxpayer and the man in uniform who has to use
the weapons suffer. [Ref. 4:p. 99]
The Competition in Contracting Act of 1984 (CICA) and
budgetary constraints have led to greater direct competition
by seeking to establish full and open competition in the
sealed bid and competitive negotiation process. National
fiscal constraints create indirect competition through
alternative uses of funds, guns or butter, and indirect
competition exists from alternative weapon systems or
strategic application with their proposed new weapon system.
However, the unique, innovative and limited use products
created in the defense market will continue to move away
from classical competition and its disciplined market.
(Ref. 3:p. 7]
B. OBJECTIVE
This research investigates two issues related to major
weapon system acquisition in the defense aerospace industry.
The objective of this research is to perform an analysis
into the presence of associations between a corporation's
financial condition and the corporation's pricing strat:gy
8
and pricing stability. In order to determine if such
associations exist, relationships between various financial
ratios and measures designed to reflect pricing strategy and
pricing stability are analyzed utilizing various statistical
procedures.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Does an identifiable relationship exist between a
corporation's financial condition and the corporation's
pricing strategy and pricing stability in the DOD aerospace
industry?
Subsidiary questions also asked include the following:
(1) A. What is financial condition?
B. What are the elements of financial condition and
what measures reflect these elements?
(2) A. How can pricing strategy be defined and measured?
B. Is pricing strategy related to financial
condition?
(3) A. How can pricing stability be defined and
measured?
B. What is the relationship between financial
measures and pricing stability?
D. SUMMARY OF THE STUDY
The purpose of this research was to determine if pricing
strategy and pricing stability for products in the defense
aerospace industry could be predicted based on a firm's
financial condition. The sample population for this
91
research included 17 contractors and 52 aircraft and missile
programs.
Two separate but related issues were addressed. The
first issue concerned the relationship between financial
condition and contractor pricing strategy. Two pricing
strategies were identified: skimming and penetration.
Slopes of price reduction curves were used to reflect
pricing strategy. Various financial ratios were used to
reflect aspects of financial condition. Eighteen ratios
were developed from corporate financial reports for the year
of initial product delivery and for the five years preceding
that delivery. These ratios were correlated with the slopes
of price reduction curves for the programs in order to test
the relationship between financial condition and pricing
strategy. The relationship was further analyzed through the
use of stepwise and heuristically selected linear regression
models. The overall findings were that a limited amount of
the price reduction curve could be explained by a linear
regression model.
The second issue concerned the relationship between
organizational slack and pricing stability. Measures of
organizational slack were determined from financial data for
each contracting firm for the six years prior to and
including the year the delivery of the first weapons system
unit by the contractor. R-squared values for learning
curves fit to price data were used to reflect price
10
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stability. Correlation analysis was used to test for
association between the slack measures and the R-squared
value for the price curve. This analysis uses both
correlation and regression methods. No useful model was
developed to relate pricing stability v.tn organizational
slack.
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY
Chapter II discusses background and conceptual
foundations. The theory and concepts underlying financial
condition, pricing strategy, pricing stability and
organizational slack are presented. The major hypothesis of
the study is stated.
Chapter III describes the sample used in the analysis
and data collection procedures.
Chapter IV describes the analysis of the relationship
between financial condition and pricing strategy. Results
from univariate correlation tests, stepwise regression
models, and heuristically developed standard regression
K
models are described and presented.
Chapter V describes the analysis of the relationship
between financial measures of organizational slack and
pricing stability. Results from statistical procedures,
primarily correlation analysis, are described and presented
Chapter VI provides the conclusions of research and
recommendations for further study.
I i U '
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II. BACKGROUND AND CONCEPTS
The Drpartment of Defense Policy on purchasing goods
and serv`.ces is to rely on commercial market prices or
competition whenever feasible. The department buys a
large number of goods and services which are readily
available in the commercial markets. . . . DOD is also
faced with the problem of purchasing a great number of
highly expensive, technologically complex, militarily
unique items for which there is no effective market
mechanism to set the price and where it is economically
impractical to obtain competition. (Ref. 5:p. 1)
Items in this category include advanced fighter aircraft,
surface to surface missiles and air to air missiles--weapons
systems which will be considered in this study. Items which




produced in relatively low volume
highly reliable ari maintainable
lengthy deve)Jpment
produced in a regulated market. (Ref. 5:p. 1)
In order to better understand the DOD pricing and
acquisition process, the following phases of the acquisition
cycle are summarized here:
- Concept exploration: both DOD and industry devote
substantial resources and time in this phase to advance
the edge of technology. Industry shares this view but
primarily to keep an edge on its competitors.
- Demonstration/validation: the decision to begin
development of a new aircraft or missile system begins
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in this phase. There is generally a mixture of DOD and
company resources devoted to the work performed to
demonstrate the feasibility of proceeding further into
the next phase.
- Full scale engineering development: this phase involves
the development of detailed specifications for entering
into the production phase. Depending on the system
there may or may not be competition in this phase.
- Production: the production phase begins when full scale
development is complete and testing has demonstrated
that the system will perform as required. In recent
years, there has been less prime contractor competition
during this phase.
- Deployment: this is the final phase of the acquisition
process and extends well beyond the completion of
production. During this phase, DOD looks for the system
developer to provide initial support, but strives to
develop a second source to enhance competition for each
respective program. [Ref. 5:p. 3]
In recent years, DOD and the military have gone to great
lengths to improve the acquisition process. Specifically,
the 1981 acquisition improvement program is perhaps the
most comprehensive approach to improve the ability to
acquire weapon systems in a more cost effective and
efficient manner. [Ref. 5:p. 18)
Two of those elements which are stressed in the acquisitions
improvement program are:
improved cost estimating;
improved program stability. (Ref. 5:p. 19]
This thesis investigates issues related to each of these i
two elements. To the extent that contractor pricing
strategy can be detected, improved cost prediction may
result. To the extent that factors affecting price
stability can be identified, issues related to program
stability may be better understood. This chapter further
13







The financial condition of a firm is most often
described through the use of various financial ratios. The
data required to construct these ratios can be found in the
annual reports of publicly traded companies. These reports
generally consist of a balance sheet, an income statement
and a statement of changes in financial position.
The balance sheet presents information regarding the
firm's assets, liabilities and stockholder's equity. The
income statement provides information with respect to
operations, including revenues, expenses, and various
measures of income, etc. Finally, the statement of changes
in financial position presents information on the flow of
funds within the firm. This includes how the firm has
obtained funds and how the firm has made use of its funds.
The raw data provided in these documents may give an
analyst a general feeling for how a given firm may be
performing. The firm's financial condition, however, can
best be described and quantified through the use of
financial ratios commonly used in financial analysis.
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1. F±inanc LRatio
It is possible to calculate a nearly limitless
number of different financial ratios given the information
provided in the reports of most sizable, publicly traded
companies. Five categories of ratios will he included in
this study:
1. Profitability





Profitability ratios enable an analyst to measure a
firm's ability to earn an adequate return on investment,
including assets and shareholder equity. The concept of
profitability may also be a driving force in determining
Pricing Strategy, a subject that will be discussed later in
this chapter. The following are some common examples of
profitability ratios.
1. Profit margin - net income/sales
2. Return on assets - net income/total assets
3. Return on equity - net income/shareholder's equity.
Profit margin should give the analyst information as
to cost control when compared to industry averages. Return
on assets will give an indication as to how well those
assets are being used with respect to other firms in the
15
same industry. Return on equity shows how well shareholders
are being compensated for the risk they have taken in buying
stock in the given firm. [Ref. 8:pp. 51-80)
There are other variants of these ratios that can be
used in the evaluation of a company's profitability. They
all aid in determining how well the firm is earning profit
given a certain amount of investment and sales activity.
3. Short Term Liauidity
Short term liquidity is generally described through
the use of two ratios. These are the Current Ratio and the
Quick Ratio. They are presented below.
1. Current Ratio - current assets/current liabilities
2. Quick Ratio - (current assets-inventory)/current
liabilities
These both illustrate a company's ability to pay off short
term debt and other short term obligations. They also
provide some indication of a firm's flexibility, its ability
to respond rapidly to new opportunities, or changes in
conditions. Short term liquidity reflects short run risk.
4. S
Solvency, or capital structure, is a measure of long
term risk. It shows the amount of and the type of debt in a
company's capital structure. This can be a good indicator
of the company's long term ability to meet obligations.
(Ref. 7:p. 5] The following are examples of solvency
ratios:
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1. Debt ratio - total liabilities/total assets
2. Times interest earned - Income before interest &
tax/interest
The debt ratio shows how prudent a company is in its
decisions to take on debt. Times Interest Earned is an
indicator of a company's ability to pay the interest on
outstanding debt.
5. Asset Utilization
Asset utilization ratios help illustrate how
efficiently a firm uses its assets. Two useful examples
are:
1. Inventory turnover = sales/inventory
2. Total asset turnover = sales/total assets.
Inventory turnover is an indicator of how well sales are
being generated per dollar of inventory. In a similar
fashion, total asset turnover shows the degree to which
sales are generated per dollar of total assets. Both ratios
relate existing investment in assets to the level or volume
of activity (sales) supported by that investment.
6. Capital Investment
Finally, capital investment ratios give an
indication of how well a company is -udating its
industrial/manufacturing facilities. These ratios are
represented by the following examples:
1. Investment to assets = new investment/total assets
2. Investment to plant = new investment/total. plant &
equipment
17
Generally, capital investment ratios relate to the amount of
new investment in productive capacity (plant and equipment)
to existing assets (or other measures of firm size).
7. Ratios to be Used in this Research
This study will make use of the ratios listed in
Table 1 below.
The ratios contained in Table 1 were chosen with
specific considerations in mind. First, in the cases of
several of these, they were used in previous similar studies
and showed some promise. [Refs. 7:p. 19; 3 :pp. 33-34]
Next, the items used in each of the ratios had to be
identifiable from the financial statements used in obtaining
the data. Finally, we attempted to use a diverse grouping
of ratios so as to minimize redundancy. We did use
available data to calculate one piece of information not
available on most financial statements reviewed. Our
investment figure for new plant and equipment was calculated
according to the following formula:
Investment in New Plant & Equipment (INPE) - Plant &
Equip. (t) - Plant & Equip. (t-l) + Depreciation (t)
where:
t - period for which INPE is being calculated
t-1 - period immediately preceding t.
We did this because no investment figures were available on





Profit Margin - net income/sales
Return on Assets - net inc./total assets
Return on Equity - net inc./stockholders equity
Short Term Liauidity
Current Ratio - current assets/current liabilities
Quick Ratio - (current assets-inv.)/current liabilities
Current Asset Ratio = current assets/total assets
Receivables Turnover - sales/accts. receivable
Debt Ratio = total liabilities/total assets
Current Debt Ratio - current liabs./total assets
Non-current Debt Ratio - Non-current Liabilities/total
assets
Interest Coverage - operating income/interest expense
Asset UtJ.lization
Total Asset Turnover - sales/total assets
Plant Asset Turnover = sales/plant & equipment
Inventory Turnover = sales/inventory
Capital Investment
Investment to Assets = investment/total assets
Investment to Plant = investment/Plant & Equipment
Investment to sales - investment/sales
Investment to Funds = investment/(net inc.+depreciation)
(Refs. 7:p. 19; 6:pp. 51-80)
In concluding this section on financial condition,
it should be emphasized that while financial condition of a
firm can be analyzed through the use of ratios, financial
ratios should be analyzed over a reasonable period of time
in order to avoid using data from a single "off year" that
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might represent a company inaccurately. It is generally
recognized that trends in data can frequently be more
valuable to the analyst than the isolated data of a single
reporting period.
B. PRICING STRATEGY
There are basically two pricing strategies used by
companies (e.g., defense contractors) when bidding for a
manufacturing contract. These strategies are known as:
1. Price Skimming
2. Penetration Pricing. [Ref. 8:pp. 76-77)
Price Skimming describes a situation where a company charges
a relatively high price for initial production units and
then reduces prices in a step-wise fashion over time. [Ref.
9:p. 7] Penetration Pricing, on the other hand, describes a
situation where a company initially sets prices low in order
to capture a large segment of the market share. Here, the
producer intends to achieve economies of scale. Future
profit is based on the learning curve theory. This theory,
in short, predicts that improved labor output and more
efficient equipment use can be a4hieved over the life of a
production run. [Ref. 9:p. 6)
1. Price Skimming
There are four reasons for a manufacturer to use a
price skimming strategy.
1. A new product is less likely to meet any competition
when initially produced. Therefore, it may not be
particularly risky to start out at a high price.
20
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2. The initial high price allows the manufacturer to
"skim the cream" of the market. This generally occurs
before the buyer (e.g., the U.S. Government) demands a
price reduction or before the manufacturer expands
market share by reducing the price.
3. The skimming strategy also appears to be the safer of
the two routes to follow. By skimming, the
manufacturer/seller gets a quick return on investment
and rapidly recovers initial development and set-up
costs.
4. The high price initially obtained for the good often
results in the in-flow of funds to the producer in
quantities sufficient to finance the expansion of
manufacturing facilities. [Ref. 10:pp. 174-175)
2. Penetration Pricing
There are also several reasons to use penetration
pricing. These are:
1. When the volume of sales is sensitive to price, then
it may be more profitable to follow the penetration
strategy.
2. When economies of scale can be achieved quickly and
large volumes can be sold on the market, then the
penetration strategy is probably appropriate.
3. Penetration pricing is appropriate when competition is
a threat from the very beginning.
4. When there are no buyers at the initial price, then
the seller must reduce prices and lean towards a
penetration strategy. [Ref. 10:p. 175]
3. Discussion of Both Strategies
The aforementioned reasons dealt with market issues.
There are other possible reasons to use one strategy or the
other, as each seems suited for firms in specific financial
environments. It is necessary to discuss pricing strategy
in the context of the aspects of financial condition.
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According to Moses (Ref. 7], profitability is not
inherently greater under either pricing strategy. Price
skimming does, however, provide for higher profits
immediately after initial production than does penetration
pricing. Moses contends that since executives are generally
compensated on the basis of profit, these same executives
might prefer the skimming strategy in order to enhance their
own personal wealth. Penetration pricing may increase the
probability that the average return on investment will
decline with the introduction of the new product. For firms
with high profitability, that return will decline even more
precipitously. Therefore, Moses hypothesizes that firms
with high profitability may prefer a skimming strategy.
Short term liquidity can certainly be affected by
the introduction of new products. Skimming is probably the
appropriate strategy for firms lacking short term funds.
This is due to the faster payback offered through skimming.
[Refs. 10:p. 174; 11:pp. 526-528) Since firms with short
term liquidity problems have more difficulty in generating
funds, they are more likely to attempt to generate funds
through their products with a skimming strategy. [Ref. 7:p.
5]
Solvency is a reflection of a firm's long term debt
structure and, therefore, its long term risk. Dean (1969)
proposed that skimming allows the firm to reduce future risk
by taking in maximum profits as soon as possible. This
22
does, however, reduce the possibility for penetration
pricing and the resulting control of market share. In
general, it can be expected that firms with poor solvency
measures may prefer to use the skimming strategy. (Ref.
7:p. 5]
Asset utilization measures can also give some
indication of a company's pricing strategy. Firms producing
at or near capacity may prefer to use price skimming. On
the other hand, a firm that is not using its manufacturing
capacity may prefer the penetration approach as this would
provide for an increased use of capacity. It might,
therefore, be expected that companies with low asset
utilization ratios may prefer penetration pricing. [Ref.
7:p. 6)
Capital investment ratios may indicate a firm's
future strategy. A company that makes major new investments
in plant and equipment might be expected to be a price
penetrator in order to increase the probability that the new
investment will be sufficiently utilized. Conversely, a
company that does not make these investments would probably
be interested in a skimming strategy.
4. Learning Curves
Learning curves have been derived from the
observation of production cost data in various industries.
These curves first came into use in the aircraft industry
during World War II. The learning curve was used by T.P.
23
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Wright to accurately predict delivery schedules for
aircraft. He did this by observing that production time for
a given aircraft shortened as the number of aircraft
produced increased. He found that this was due to increased
worker expertiee and experience.
Learning curves are discussed here because they will
be used to operationalize the concept of pricing strategy.
This research will attempt to find a relationship between
the slopes of price reduction curves (i.e., learning curves)
and a company's financial condition. The two pricing
strategies can be characterized by first unit price and the
degree of price reduction over time. A skimming strategy
typically involves a relatively high initial price coupled
with a relatively steep reduction in price over the life of
the project or product. In contrast, the penetration
strategy involves a relatively low initial price with little
or no price reduction over time. The degree of price
reduction can be captured by the slope of a learning curve
fit to price data.
According to Liao [Ref. 13), there are two different
concepts of the learning curve. These are the Cumulative
Average Cost Concept and the Incremental Unit Cost Concept.
5. Cumulative Averaae Cost Curves
Cumulative average cost curves are determined




C(Q) - cumulative average cost for quantity Q
Q = cumulative quantity
A = the cost of the first unit produced
B = the slope of the curve.
The value B can be found through the use of the formula:
B - in S/in 2
where:
S = the percentage reduction in cumulative average
costs as quantity is doubled
B is usually determined through regression analysis. [Ref.
14)
The idea here is that as production quantity is
doubled, the average cost of cumulative production is
reduced to:
S x (100%) x (the cost of the previous level).
For example, a learning curve with a 0.80 slope (80%) will
show that as production quantity doubles, the newest
doubling of the production level costs only 80 percent of
the previous level. Table 2 illustrates a hypothetical
production line.
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6. Incremental Unit Cost Concept
Unit cost curves are determined in the same way that
cumulative curves are, with the exception that different
values are used. Unit cost learning curves take the form:
TABLE 2
HYPOTHETICAL PRODUCTION LINE
Production Cumulative Cumulative Costs
Lot Quantity Total Per Unit
1 1 $100 $100
2 2 $160 $ 80
3 4 $256 $ 64
4 8 $409.6 $ 51.2
C =AXB
where:
C = cost of unit X
X = unit number
B = slope of the curve - in S/ln 2
A = cost of first unit.
Since we assume that learning is a continuous process, the
cost of each unit should be less than the one that
immediately preceded it, as less labor input is necessary.
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As we are dealing with lots of aircraft, it should
be noted that the average cost of the lot is equal to the
cost of one production unit within that lot. In order to




Lot Midpoint (i) Qi
where:
n = cumulative quantity produced to time i
B = learning curve exponent (learning rate factor).
Considering the above equation, it is clear that the lot
midpoint is dependent on the learning rate factor. Because
of this, an iterative procedure is used to calculate unit
learning curve values. The procedure is as follows:
1. Calculate an initial estimate for B using arithmetic
mean values for lot midpoints.
2. Calculate lot midpoints from the above equation using
the last estimate for B.
3. Calculate a revised estimate for B using new
midpoints.
4. Repeat steps 2 and 3 until the values for B agree
within a very small error. [Ref 14:111]
Through the use of regression we can now obtain values for
slopes and for first unit costs. Table 3 shows how
incremental costs relate to quantity produced using an 80%




INCREMENTAL COSTS AND QUANTITY PRODUCED
Production Cumulative Incremental Costs
Lot Quantity Total Per Unit
1 1 $100 $100
2 2 $ 60 $ 60
3 4 $ 96 $ 48
4 8 $153.6 $ 38.4
[Ref. 13:p. 4]
There is little difference in using the Cumulative
Average Cost Concept or the Incremental Unit Cost Concept.
One advantage of the Incremental Unit Cost Concept is that
it can be used to discuss current operating problems with
operating personnel in the manufacturing facility. [Ref.
13:p. 3)
There may be argument as to which provides the
better representation of improved product production due to
learning. Neither, however, is considered to be a preferred
method. Measures of the slope of learning curves (using the
unit cost concept) are used in this study to reflect price
reduction and pricing strategy.
The next section of this chapter will deal with
pricing stability and the concept of slack.
C. PRICING STABILITY
This section of Chapter II introduces the concept of
organizational slack and hypothesizes a relationship between
price stability and slack based on the amount of "slack"
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present within the firm. First, a conceptual review of past
studies of slack is presented followed by various
definitions of slack. Then, a basis for establishing a
relationship between slack and pricing stability is
addressed. Finally, various methods to measure
organizational slack including the method utilized in this
thesis are reviewed.
1. Review of Past Studiem
March and Simon introduced the concept of
"organizational slack" in discussing business's ability to
react to economic and environmental fluctuations.
Specifically, they suggested that slack is one factor
affecting the goals of an organization and, as such,
directly impacts on intergroup conflicts:
When resources are plentiful, subordinate claims are not
challenged and goal differentiation occurs; when resources
become restricted, group interactions become more
competitive, conflict increases, and diversification is
reduced. [Ref. 16:p. 1)
Although March and Simon dealt with the concept of
organizational slack in discussing how organizations
discover economies in times of crisis, it was Cyert and
March who first proposed slack as a central variable of
their behavioral theory of the firm. (Ref. 17:p. 37] Cyert
and March defined organizational slack as "payments in
excess of those required to maintain coalition." They
suggested that slack may be manifested in many forms and






organizations and to absorb fluctuations in the environment.
[Ref. 17:p. 38] In other words, slack acts as a stabilizer
during prosperous times and as an emergency source of
resources during bad times.
Following Cyert and March were Williamson and Schiff
& Lewin. Their studies treated slack from the "managerial
approach." Williamson suggested that managers have positive
preferences for staff, salaries and discretionary profit.
His primary emphasis was on management controlling the
activities of the firm (staff, salary, profit) in order to
achieve certain self-seeking objectives. [Ref. 18:p. 241]
Williamson also discussed absorbed and unabsorbed slack.
When the firm's environment is favorable, staff
expenditures will be permitted to absorb excessive amounts
of slack. Under conditions of adversity, expenditures for
managerial superfluities, staff expenditures and
management slack expenditures will be reduced. (Ref.
18:p. 252]
Williamson continues by citing the motivational bases which
impel management to strive for resources to satisfy personal
needs, and implies that, contrary to Cyert and March, slack
is not readily recoverable because these motivational
factors are active in both good and poor economic times.
[Ref. 19 :p. 303
Schiff and Lewin's managerial approach to
organizational slack centers around managers strategically
using the budget and other financial control systems in ways
unintended by top management. These methods included the
submission of lower revenue projections than actually
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anticipated, use of standard costs that do not incorporate
improvements and inclusion of larger than actually necessary
staff and marketing expenses which could be reduced at will
without having serious impact on the firm's operations. In
addition, budgets may be submitted by division managers
which are "reworked" until they meet the profit goal
expected by top management. [Ref. 19:p. 31] It is in this
light that Schiff and Lewin share Williamson's view that
slack is consciously bargained for and that management can
control the amount of slack to reduce uncertainty and
satisfy personal needs.
Litschert and Bonham developed a conceptual model of
strategy formulation which suggests that there is an
interrelationship between strategy and structure that to a
degree depends on the level of organizational slack. They
also stated that slack affects the direction of the
strategy-structure relationship by influencing the necessary
fit between organization structure and the interactive
effects of technologies and environments.
When slack is low there are no excess resources to pay the
price of structural design. . . . Necessary fit is tight,
and strategy is determined by structure, at least in part.
When slack is relatively high, excess resources are
available to pay the price of a structural design. (Ref.
20:p. 217]
In this case, necessary fit may be loose because eccnomic
sacrifice is minimized, and strategy is likely to be more
contingent on the ideological values of the dominant
coalition. (Ref. 20:p. 217]
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Dimmick and Murray in studying human resource policy
decisions indicated that an organization's size is closely
related to organizational slack.
The fact that slack and size showed a similar pattern of
relationship to logistic policies and practice suggest
that either size or financial success allows organizations
to commit resources to activities which have significant
fixed cost. (Ref. 21:p. 617]
Dimmick and Murray further went on to say that the number of
people in an organization is a more relevant indicator of
size than is revenue when it comes to explaining patterns in
logistic policies. (Ref. 21:p. 616)
Bourgeois' study of organizational slack dealt with
several opposing views on how slack promotes political
behavior within organizations. Cyert and March stated that
slack serves to reduce goal conflict while Astley
hypothesized that slack was used to promote political
behavior within organizations. Bourgeois' study took the
various conceptual terms of slack and put them in empirical
form and provided a usable definition of slack consistent
with the available literature. (Ref. 22:p. 29]
Following Bourgeois, Bourgeois and Singh examined
the effects of slack on political behavior and strategic
discord within top management. Specifically, they tested
the two opposite theories of Astley and Cyert and March
utilizing an empirical measure based on financial
indicators. They developed three components of slack which
could be empirically related to strategy-making behaviors
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within top management teams. The first component,
recoverable slack, proved to reduce political behavior while
the other two components, available and potential slack,
appeared to increase political behavior. [Ref. 23:p. 42]
Following Bourgeois and Singh, a thorough review of
slack was done by Singh. Singh viewed slack as a two
component concept instead of a single dimension construct.
These two components are absorbed slack and unabsorbed
slack. Absorbed slack, similar to recoverable slack, refers
to the slack that is generated into an organizational system
design and is absorbed as excess cost. Unabsorbed slack
constitutes those resources that remain in excess of those
already absorbed. (Ref. 17:p. 46] Further study by Singh
proposed and tested several hypotheses relating performance,
slack and risk taking in strategic decision making.
Utilizing theory from Cyert and March that there is a
positive relationship between organizational performance and
slack, Singh proposed and tested the hypothesis that slack
increases with good performance and decreases with poor
performance or, in general terms, performance has a positive
effect on slack. (Ref. 17:p. 25]
With regard to slack and risk taking, Singh proposed
that organizational slack has a positive effect on risk
taking in strategic decision making. While greater absorbed
slack was found to enhance risk taking, no such correlation
was found when dealing with unabsorbed slack. Singh
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therefore concluded that better performance leads only to
higher levels of absorbed slack and additional risk taking.
Unabsorbed slack as we alluded to earlier, does not have the
same effect due to the fact that these uncommitted resources
do not play the same buffering role when they are "outside
the workflow of the organization" unlike absorbed
slack/resources which are an integral part of the
organizational activities. [Refs. 17:p. 26; 11:p. 6)
Gershenberg showed that by measuring the amount of
slack in labor, capital, and management inputs, one might
find that internal growth and development are possible
without acquiring additional resources. By studying the
large amounts of slack available to several Kenyan
manufacturing firms, he found that better utilization of
already existing resources could lead to increased
productivity without expansion. Gershenberg suggested
that one solution to excessive slack would be to e~tablish
new noncompeting firms; only such complementary
enterprises would reduce the amount of slack resources
within the economy. (Ref. 11:p. 2)
In short, these past studies seem to support the
following general conclusions concerning slack:
1. There is a close correlation between organizational
size and organizational slack.
2. There is an empirical measure of organizational slack
composed of several financial indicators resulting in
three separate dimensions of slack: recoverable,
potential and available slack.
3. Slack has been shown to be related to the risk and
performance of firms, and slack has been shown to be
related to various kinds of strategic and political
behavior by management.
2. Dtfinitions of Organizational Slack
The concept of slack has gone through various stages
from March and Simon to the analysis done by Bourgeois and
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Singh. March, well-known as the pioneer, has defined slack
in many diverse ways. In 1963 March, along with Cyert,
described slack as:
The disparity between the resources available to the
organization a&J the payments required to maintain the
coalition. [Ref. 22:p. 31]
child defined slack as:
The margin of surplus which permits an organization's
dominant coalition to adopt structural arrangements which
accord with their own preferences, even at some extra
administrative cost. [Ref. 22:p. 31]
Cohen, March and Olsen defined it as: "The difference
between the resources of the organization and the
combination of demands made on it." [Ref. 17:p. 44]
In 1978 Dimmick and Murray reported that slack
consisted of "those resources which an organization has
,acquired which are not committed to necessary expenditure.
In essence, these are resources which can be used in a
discretionary manner." (Ref. 17:p. 44]
March refined his earlier definition and stated:
Since organizations do not always optimize, they
accumulate spare resources and unexploited opportunities
which then become a buffer against bad times. Although
the buffer is not necessarily intended, slack produces
performance smoothing, reducing performance during good
times and improving it during bad times. (Ref. 17:p. 43]
Finally, Bourgeois offers a more concise definition
by paraphrasing James March:
Organizational slack is the cushion of actual or
potential resources which allows an organization to adapt
successfully to internal pressures for change in policy,
as well as to external changes in strategy with respect to
the external environment. (Ref. 22:p. 30)
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From the definiions "i'..ed in this chapter, we can see that
slack has many diverse meanings and can be interpreted in
numerous ways. The central theme behind the majority of
definitions is that slack consists of "excess resources,"
which allow the firm flexibility in reacting to internal and
external demands or opportunities.
3. runctions of Slack
Bourgeois further suggested that slack either
"causes" or serves four primary functions:
(1) First slack is considered as an inducement for
organizational actors to remain within the system.
In other words, how much would an individual
sacrifice in monetary terms or in status items to
remain with a firm in an economic crisis. (Ref.
22:p. 33]
(2) The second function of slack is a resource for
conflict resolution. This function is highlightedin
a review by Moch and Pondy who observe that "slack
allows choice opportunities to be distributed
generally to all participants. With sufficient
slack, there will be a solution for every problem."
(Ref. 22:p. 34]
(3) The third function of slack is a facilitator of
certain types of strategic or creative behavior
within the organization. Hambrick and Snow viev this
excess slack as allowing an organization to be more
innovative and interact in the market more boldly.
As a facilitator of suboptimal behavior, slack is
perceived as allowing one to "satisfice environmental
opportunities, as well as to smooth organizational
performance in the face of environmental hostility."
(Ref. 22:p. 39]
(4) Finally, sleck serves as a buffering mechanism in the
workflow process. James Thompson explained this
function in terms of the need to "buffer the
technical technical core" from the variances and
discontinuities presented by environmental demands."
(Ref. 22:p. 33] In a production sense, this meant to
absorb the inconsistencies in the supply delivery
schedule and to absorb fluctuations in demands.
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4. RelationshiR Between Organizational Slack and
Pricing Stability
There are many factors which affect the stability of
prices: inflation, changes in input cost, the size of the
production runs, schedule change, program modifications,
etc. However, the fourth function of slack, just mentioned
above, provides a potential explanation for price stability.
[Ref. 12)
As we alluded to earlier, slack involves the notion
of "excess," "surplus," or "uncommitted" resources that
provide "buffers" or "cushions" or "opportunities." From
the definitions presented earlier by Bourgeois dealing with
internal and external pressures or Thompson's "buffering of
the technical core," pricing stability may be related to
slack due to the ability of the firm to absorb changes in
production schedules or proqram modifications which have an
influence on price instability. The ability of the firm to
absorb these influences may be conditional on slack. [Ref.
12]
Slack is a somewhat amorphous concept. But recent
research (Bourgeois, Singh, Bourgeois & Singh; Moses) has
outlined the dimensions of slack and identified financial
variables to measure it. Briefly, slack comes from
several sources:
A. Resources generated from increased profits
B. Resources tied up in excess working capital
C. Resources absorbed in excess working capital
D. Resources tied up in excess plant or productive
capacity
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E. Resources potentially available from outside the
organization due to the capacity to raise capital.
Slack available to the firm from each of these sources can
be measured by financial ratios reflecting financial
condition. (Ref. 12]
The second objective of this thesis is to
investigate the relationship between measures of financial
condition reflecting organizational slack and the stability
of prices charged by contractors for major weapon systems.
It is possible that the stability of prices observed on a
given program is related to measures of financial
condition. This assertion rests on two ideas: A)
Measures of financial condition reflect the amount of
"slack" in an organization, and B) The ability of an
organization to absorb variations in its environment and
smooth its operations is related to the amount of slack.
(Ref. 12]
Next we will look at measurement of slack.
5. Measurement of Slack
Review of past literature shows that slack has a
wide range of definitions and is conceptualized in many
different ways. The majority of researchers agree that
slack consists of "excess" or uncommitted resources but no
one has determined specifically how we should quantitatively
measure slack.
There have been various methods used throughout the
years to measure organizational slack. A popular method
has been that of Odell who utilized questionnaires to
derive a perceptual measure of slack based on perceived
differences between a firm's inducements and contribu-
tions. Later, Kmetz used three sets of questionnaires to
measure slack resources, slack performance, and production
smoothing. Finally, Gershenberg utilized surveys to
estimate the amount of labor, capital, and management
slack and asked if the uses of resources would change if
the current level of demand were increased by some amount.
38
S-- ... ... --- --- --- -- --------
If not, that maximum percentage level was considered to be
the amount of available slack. (Ref. 16:p. 133
These surveys rely on the firms to supply the data;
consequently their subjectivity and susceptibility to
misinterpretation cannot be avoided. A consistent,
quantitative measure of slack that can be used for
comparative empirical examination cannot be derived from
these qualitative methods. (Ref. 16:p. 13]
Surveys and questionnaires do not measure slack in
the quantitative form that is needed in order for it to be
an effective management tool. This problem was tackled by
Bourgeois and Singh and their approach will be the basis for
measurement in this thesis.
In 1981, Bourgeois utilized public financial records
to develop slack measures that would enable the researchers
to distingui&h between "slack gainers" and "slack losers."
Bourgeois Lr.•:.-.Luced the above terms in a relative sense
rather than in absolute terms. His emphasis was to look at
financial statistics over a period of time with the
objective being to look at trends and not just a snapshot of
one day of the year. (Ref. 22:p. 37)
Bourgeois introduced two sources of slack:
internal, or that created by managerial action, and
external, or that made available by the environment. [Ref.
22:p. 37) Bourgeois and Singh further developed this model[m
by conceptualizing three categories of slack which rest on
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the idea of ease of recovery: available, recoverable and
potential slack.
(1) Available slack consists of resources not yet
assimilated into the technical design of the
organization. It can be measured by an:
increase in: net profit - dividends/sales
increase in: (cash I marketable securities-
current liabilities)/sales
decrease in: dividends/net worth
(2) Recoverable slack consists of resources that have
been absorbed into the system as excess but may be
recovered. It can be measured by:
increase in: accounts receivable/sales
increase in: inventory/sales
increase in: general & admin exp/sales
(3) The last category, potential slack is defined as the
capacity of an organization to generate extra
resources from the environment. Potential slack can
be measured by a:
decrease in: long term debt/net worth or an
increase in: price earnings ratio. [Ref. 23:p.
43]
These 'easures are relative measures of slack in two
senses: in addition to measuring change from the prior
year, they incorporate a control for any changes in the
measurement due to Jincreases or decreases in the overall
activity. [Ref. 2 3 :p. 44]
The approach of Bourgeois and Singh and Bourgeois will be
the approach used to measure slack in this thesis.
6. Summary
We examined several definitions of slack. The
consensus in this section was that slack consists of
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"excess" or "surplus" available to a firm. Bourgeois (1981)
offers the most concise definition:
Organizational slack is the cushion of actual or potential
resources which allows an organization to adopt success-
fully to internal pressures for changes in policy, as well
as to internal changes in strategy with respect to the
external environment. (Ref. 22:p. 7]
The relationship between slack and pricing stability
was also examined. It is possible that the stability of
prices observed on a given program is related to measures of
financial condition. That assertion is the basis for the
second portion of this thesis and rests on the premise
that:
A) measures of financial condition reflect the amount of
slack in an organization, and
B) the ability of an organization to absorb variations in
its environment and "smooth" operations is related to
the amount of slack present.
Finally, we examined various forms of the
measurement of slack ranging from questionnaires to the
utilization of public financial records. We introduced a 3-
dimensional categorization of slack offered by Bourgeois and
Singh and listed particular specific measures within each
category. The individual measures of slack were similar to
commonly used measures of financial condition.
D. HYPOTHESES
Considering the foregoing discussions of relevant
theory, we hypothesize the following:
1. That a quantifiable relationship exists between A
company's financial condition and its pricing
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strategy, as reflected in the slope of a c mpany's
price reduction curve.
2. That a quantifiable relationship exists between a
company's financial condition and the stability of
prices experienced over the life of a program.
The next chapter will discuss how the necessary data
were obtained for use in this study.
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III. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA COLLECTION
This chapter will describe the following:
1. The process used to select aircraft and missile
programs for the sample.
2. The data items from specific programs required for the
statistical analysis.
3. The various financial measures acquired, their
sources, and their availability.
A. SELECTION PROCESS
Aircraft and missile programs used in this study were
based on the availability of the following information:
1. Slope of the unit cost curve for the airframe.
2. R-squared of the unit cost curve for the airframe.
We decided to use the data associated with airframe costs
instead of total flyaway costs on the assumption that the
airframe is produced totally by the prime contractor.
Avionics, engines, armament, test equipment, etc., are
frequently supplied either by the government or by various
subcontractors.
We found the necessary slopes and R-squared data in two
sources. These were the U.S. Military Aircraft Cost
Handbook [Ref. 14] and the U.S. Military Missile Cost
Handbook (Ref. 15]. These sources provided the following
necessary information:
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1. Aircraft and missile identification
2. Manufacturer identification
3. Service branch purchaser of each system
4. Various detailed and summary cost data. (Refs. 14,15]
In short, these two handbooks provided the bases f or our
data collection efforts. These two handbooks were not
complete in the data presented. Many of the systems listed
had little or none of the data that we required. Therefore,
we restricted our sample to the programs which had all of
the aforementioned data available. In addition, we only
used data for publicly-held companies, as we encountered
difficulties in obtaining financial data from privately-held
companies.
Table 4 presents the f irms, programs, and the years of
the programs' lives. It includes seventeen different
contractors and a total of fifty-two programs.
Financial data for the companies listed were obtained
from their annual reports as published in Mod'
Inutras We extracted elements from these reports as
shown in Table 5. This information was collected for the
year of each program start, and for each of the five years
preceding each program start.
We did encounter some minor problems in obtaining all
the necessary data. In some cases, Cash and Marketable
Securities were listed as a single account. In these cases,
we listed the total figure as cash in our data base. We
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TABLE 4
LIST OF CONTRACTORS AND PROGRAMS
Manufacturer ProgrqAm Year Started Yea n





Motorola AIM-9C 61 67
Bell AH-1S 75 80
AH-IT 76 78
Bendix RIM-8E 61 66





McDonnell Douglas F-15A 73 79
A-4M 70 77




Northrop F-89D 51 54




Fairchild A-10A 75 82
Cessna A-37B 67 73
Boeing B-47B/E 49 53
B-52G 57 59





Republic F-84F 51 53
F-105B/D 57 f2
Martin B-57B/C/E 52 55
Raytheon AIM-7F 68 80
AIM-7M 80 82














































investment in new plant and equipment
earnings per common share
mean common stock price
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then gave Marketable Securities a 0 value in the data base.
This should not make any difference in our analysis as we
did not use any financial ratio that had Marketable
Securities as a single element.
In a small number of cases, certain financial data were
not published for a given year. We found that it was not
unusual to find extremely detailed financial reporting for
one year and then only a bare minimum of information
available for the next year. In a few cases, we calculated
additional needed data from the minimal amount at hand.
Finally, there was a minor problem with mergers. The
most difficult problem was with the McDonnell Douglas
Corporation. We decided to drop several programs from our
sample because of the unclear data presented in certain
financial reports. It was not always possible to get the
needed six years of financial data for a program, given that
a company had recently been established or merged with
another. In these cases, we found it better to leave
programs associated with such problems out of the sample.
Overall, we feel we have a reasonably accurate and
complete data base. It totals 9,464 individual pieces of
data.
All necessary measures of financial condition and
organizational slack outlined in Chapter II can be
calculated from the data items collected and described in
this chapter. The next two chapters present our analysis.
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Chapter IV addresses the association between pricing
strategy (as measured by the slope of price reduction
curves) and measures or financial condition. Chapter V
addresses the association between pricing stability (as
measured by the "fit" of R-squared of pricing curves) and
measures of organizational slack.
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IV. DATA ANALYSIS: FINANCIAL CONDITION
AND THE PRICE REDUCTION CURVE
A. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this analysis was to determine if stable,
significant relationships exist between finarcial condition
and the slopes of price reduction curves. The years of the
research were represented by the numbers 0 through 5 with 0
representing the year when the first delivery occurred. The
years 1-5 represent the number of years prior to initial
delivery.
Several tests were performed to detect any stable,
significant relationships. These were:
1. Correlation analyses were performed on individual
ratios for each of the years in question (years 5-0).
2. Regression analyses were performed on the financial
ratios for year 3. The first action taken was to
perform a stepwise regression. Then several other
regression models were created by observing the
correlation data and heuristically choosing inputs for
the models.
3. Regression analyses were again performed in order to
analyze yearly change in financial ratios. This
consisted of the following four parts:
a. Manipulation of the data to measure change over
time.
b. Correlation analyses of the periods of change.
c. Stepwise regression of the new ratios for years 3-
2, followed by several linear regression models
with inputs chosen heuristically by observing the
correlation data.
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d. Stepwise regression of the new ratios for the
years 2-1, followed by several other linear
regression models chosen heuristically by
observing the correlation data.
B. CORRELATION ANALYSIS
Correlation analyses were performed between the
financial ratios and the slopes of the price reduction
curves. This was done for each of the years included in
this research. The objectives here were as follows:
1. To determine the signs of the relationships between
the ratios and the slopes of the price curves.
2. To check the statistical significance of these
relationships.
3. To observe consistency and/or trends in relationships
over time.
The results of the correlation analyses are presented in
Table 6.
C. OBSERVATIONS OF SIGNS
The first important observation was that the signs of
the correlation coefficients did not always match the
predicted (hypothesized) signs. The hypothesized signs were
selected based on Moses' earlier work (Ref. 7]. For the 18
available ratios, the actual results are listed below.
Year 5 5 signs as predicted
Year 4 8 signs as predicted
Year 3 6 signs as predicted
Year 2 7 signs as predicted
Year 1 11 signs as predicted
Year 0 11 signs as predicted
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TABLE 6
CORRELATION RESULTS
Category/ Predicted Correlation Coefficients




.11 -. 01 -. 31* -. 08 -. 14 -. 19
2. Return on
Assets 
.12 .03 -. 22* -. 08 -. 09 .04
3. Return on
Equity 




Ratio + -. 27* -. 27* -. 37* -. 36* .05 .08
5. Quick Ratio + -. 26* -. 44* -. 43* -. 40* .01 .01
6. Current Asset
Ratio + -. 24* -. 22 -. 21 -. 25* -. 27* -. 01
7. Receivables
Turnover + -. 03 -. 01 -. 12 -. 12 -. 24 -. 02
Solvency/
8. Debt Ratio 
- .23* .19 .39* .45* .10 .01
9. Non-current
Debt Ratio 
.12 .18 .28* .30* -. 16 -. 10
10. Non-current
Debt Ratio 
.27* .21 .25* .33* .39* .12
11. Interest





Turnover - -. 01 .18 .18 .04 -. 19 -. 06
13. Plant Asset
Turnover - -. 06 -. 03 -. 06 -. 09 -. 19 -. 18
14. Inventory




to Assets + .33 .14 .05 .05 -. 04 .01
16. Investment
to Plant + -. 14 .06 -. 05 .01 -. 16 -. 07
17. Investment
to Sales + -. 42 .06 -. 01 .05 .01 -. 06
18. Investment
to Funds + .60* .04 .06 .02 .08 .21
*Indicates significant at the .10 alpha level (S .10)
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There were certain trends noted in the correlation data.
VTrst, the predicted signs and the actual signs of the
correlation coefficients tended to match more frequently as
time before project start decreased. This was particularly
true of ratios in tha following categories:
1. Profitability--the signs tended to match after year 4.
2. Asset Utilization--the signs tended to match
throughout the six year period.
3. Capital Investment--the ratios "Investments to Assets"
and "Investments to Funds" tended to match throughout
the six year period.
D. STATISTICAL SIGNIFICANCE
Most of the univariate correlations were insignificant
at the .10 alpha level. This indicates that there was < 10
percent probability that such a correlation would occur by
chance. The ones that were consistently significant over
time were:
Y ears of Significance
Current ratio 5,4,3,2
Quick ratio 5,4,3,2
Non-current debt ratio 5,3,2
Interest coverage 2,1,0
Inventory turnover 1,0
The following is a list of the ratios that had statistically
significant coefficients in both year 3 and in year 2.
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Pred. Corr. Coeffs. Significance
Ratio~ ~ L~n y. r yra 3 y,
Current ratio + -. 37 -. 36 .01 .01
Quick ratio + -. 43 -. 40 .01 .01
Debt ratio - .39 .45 .01 .01
Curr. debt ratio - .28 .30 .04 .03
Non-curr. debt ratio .25 .33 .07 .07
In none of the above cases did the predicted signs match
the actual result of the correlation analysis. There were
individual cases, however, where the predicted signs of the
correlation coefficients did match the actual results, and
where these coefficients were statistically significant. In




Profit margin -. 31 .02
Return on assets - -. 22 .10
Year 3 was the only period for which the correlation
coefficients of the profitability ratios were significant at
the .10 alpha level. This could indicate that a
quantifiable relationship exists between profitability and
the slope of the price reduction curve about three years
prior to initial product delivery.
There were also year to year differences in the
statistical significance of the correlation coefficients.
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The greatest number of statistically significant
coefficients were found in years 3 and 2. In each of these
years, seven coefficients had significance levels (alpha
levels) of .10 or less. This could indicate that data from
these years would be the best to include in a model for
predicting the slopes of price reduction curves.
In general, however, the univariate tests proved
inconclusive. The magnitude of the correlation coefficients
was usually quite small. All too often, the level of
significance exceeded the acceptable boundary of .1. Moses
suggests that "univariate tests may be inappropriate and
that controlling for the inherent interrelationships between
individual ratios with a multivariate design may be
helpful." (Ref. 7:p. 12] The results of these correlation
analyses tended to support that finding.
E. REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Although the shortcomings of the univariate correlation
analysis were recognized, the research continued to the
regression stage. The objective of the regression analysis
was to examine various variables for their potential as
predictors of the slopes of the price reduction curves. The
steps taken here wero to perform a forward stepwise
regression, and then to perform several linear regressions
in an iterative and heuristic manner.
First, we performed a stepwise regression using all 18
variables. The stepwise regression selected variables
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statistically on the basis of incremental explanatory power.
Variables were chosen without regard for category (the five
dimensions of financial condition outlined in Chapter II) or
predicted sign.
Next, we performed several different linear regressions.
Here, we used a judgmental approach, taking into account the
hypothesized signs for the independent variables. In
addition, we attempted to minimize the use of more than one
ratio from each category.
The regressions were performed with data from year 3.
The reason that year 3 data were selected was that informal
discussion with officials at the Naval Air Systems Command
indicated that production of an aircraft or missile
generally commences about three years after the signing of a
contract.
F. STEPWISE REGRESSION
The stepwise regression was used to determine what
variables might be most important in building a predictive
model. The following ratios are presented with partial and
cumulative model R-squared values, predicted signs, and
regression coefficients.
Marginal C m. Std. Regr.
Year 3 Ratios 2 Er Coeffr
Return on assets .1597 .1597 .51 -1.55
Investment to funds .0688 .2285 .0004 -. 0008
Total assets turnover .0751 .3037 .02 .06
Receivpbles turnover .0409 .3445 .02 -. 03
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No other variables were included in this model, as these
were the only ones that met .15 significance level required
by the software in use. The predicted and actual signs of
the coefficients for the independent variables matched for
rate of return and investment to funds. The signs did not
match for total assets turnover and receivables turnover.
Although the results of the stepwise regression were not
particularly strong, the regression model does explain a
larger percentage of the variance in price reduction slope
than does any individual ratio. The R-squared value for the
four ratio model was 34.5 percent.
In addition to the stepwise regression, several linear
regression models were created by observing the correlation
results and heuristically selecting ratios for inclusion in
the model. Three factors influenced the construction of the
model. These were:
1. A model should be constructed with the minimum number
of ratios possible.
2. There should be low collinearity across the set of
ratios in the model.
3. There should be only one measure of each construct in
the model. In general, this means that only one ratio
from each category could be used. In a few cases,
however, ratios from the same category did not
represent the same construct. Pairwise correlations
between the ratios were examined. If the pairwise
correlation coefficient was not greater than .40, then
we felt it was appropriate to include both ratios in a
given model.
Many different models were attempted. Two statistical
criteria were used to evaluate the models. n were:
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1. F-value and its level of significance.
2. Adjusted R-squared.
The best of the models examined was:
slope - .94 - 1.55X(l) - .0008X(2) + .06X(3) - .03X(4)
(.08) (.85) (.0007) (.03) (.04)
where:
X(1) - Return on assets 3
X(2) - Receivables turnover 3
X(3) = Total assets turnover 3
X(4) - Interest to funds 3
Standard errors in parentheses.
The relevant statistical values for this model were:
F-value = 3.40
alpha (F) = .0737
adjusted R-squared - .3445.





Total assets turnover +
Investment to funds +
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Only one ratio, return on assets, had the predicted
sign. This could suggest that there exists an inverse
relationship between price reduction curve slope and the
three ratios holding signs opposite those predicted. This
casts doubt on the arguments presented in Chapter II for
expecting particular relationships between financial
condition and pricing strategy.
This model includes all of the financial categories
except Solvency. This model, however, still has a
relatively low R-squared value and a relatively low F-value.
For these reasons, another approach was taken in the effort
to build a usable model.
G. ANALYSIS OF YEARLY CHANGE
In this part of the research, the data were transformed
to construct measures of the year to year change in the
financial ratios. The following construct was used to
reflect change over time.
Change (from time T-l 1 financial ratio (at time T)
to time T) = gfinancial ratio (at time T-l)
Once the data were transformed, the same steps were
taken as in the previous analysis. The first step taken was
to perform a correlation analysis. The results of this are
presented in Table 7.
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TABLE 7
CORRELATION RESULTS (CHANGE BETWEEN YEARS)
Measures of Correlation Coefficients
Change
Pred. Yrs. Yrs. Yrs. Yrs. Yrs.(Catecorv/Ratio Sig 5-4 4-ý 3- 2-1 10
Profitability/
1. Profit Margin - .05 -. 24 .06 -. 15 .15
2. Return on Assets - .11 -. 22 .02 -. 07 .03
3. Return on Equity - .11 -. 22 .04 -. 16 -. 02
Short Term Liquidity/
4. Current Ratio + -. 02 -. 14 .01 .54* .07
5. Quick Ratio + -. 11 -. 10 .02 .33* -. 09
6. Cur. Asset Ratio + -. 08 -. 12 -. 11 -. 06 -. 03
7. Receiv. Turnover + .21 -. 10 -. 03 -. 07 .18
Solvency/
8. Debt Ratio - -. 09 .21 .01 -. 50* .01
9. Cur. Debt Ratio - .01 .16 -. 03 -. 53* -. 06
10. DON Current
Debt Ratio - .03 .10 .02 .20 -. 26
11. Int. Coverage + .30 -. 24 -. 05 -. 20 .28
Asset Utilization/
12. Total Asset
Turnover - .03 .01 -. 15 -. 06 -. 10
13. Plant Asset
Turnover - .09 .05 -. 13 -. 01 -. 12
14. Inv. Turnover - -. 08 .06 -. 07 -. 06 -. 20
Capital Investment/
15. Inv. to Assets + .40 -. 35* .07 -. 02 .03
16. Inv. to Plant + .30 -. 34* .07 -. 02 .01
17. Inv. to Sales + .52 -. 34* .13 .05 -. 01
18. Inv. to Funds + .17 -. 21 .03 -. 07 .02




We again observed that there were disparities between
predicted and actual signs of the correlation coefficients.
For the 18 measures of change, the actual results were as
follows:
Year 5-4 7 signs as predicted
Year 4-3 3 signs as predicted
Year 3-2 10 signs as predicted
Year 2-1 11 signs as predicted
Year 1-0 11 signs as predicted
Again, we recognized that the predicted signs and the
actual signs of the correlation coefficients tended to match
more frequently as time before initial product delivery
decreased. This was particularly true of the measures of
change in the asset utilization category. In this case, the
signs (predicted and actual) matched for the last three time
periods prior to initial delivery.
Again, most of the univariate correlations were
insignificant at the .10 alpha level. There were no trends
observed for the levels of significance for each of the
correlation coefficients.
We decided to focus on years 3-2 in further developing
this analysis. We did this because these measures of change
included the year 3 data used in our earlier regression
analyses.
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The results for years 3-2 are mixed. While ten of the
correlation coefficients had signs that matched the
hypothesized signs, none of them had a level of significance
that matched the requirements for this research.
I. REGRESSION ANALYSIS
A stepwise regression was attempted using the data for
years 3-2 to see if a multivariate approach would exhibit
improved associations. No results were realized through
this stepwise regression as the insignificance of the
coefficients prevented the building of even a single
variable model.
In light of this development, we considered an
alternative time frame. The data for years 2-1 were chosen
because several ratios appeared to be significant in the
correlation test. The current ratio, quick ratio, debt
ratio and the current debt ratio all met the significance
level requirement of .10. In addition, each of these had
signs matching the predicted ones.
A stepwise regression was performed and resulted in the
following model:
slope = .906 + .597X(l) - .143X(2)
(.02) (.13) (.06)
where:




alpha (F) - .0275
X(1) - current ratio
X(2) - quick ratio
Standard errors in parentheses.
This model showed a definite improvement in R-squared
and F values. However, it is important to note that the
current ratio and the quick ratio are virtually the same
construct. Only one aspect of financial condition is
captured in this model. That is short term liquidity. In
addition, the two variables enter the model with opposite
signs. In this respect, the model is probably not very
useful.
This stepwise regression was followed with several
linear regression models. Several different models were
constructed using three or four of the most promising
ratios. We performed these regressions in an attempt to
develop a model that would capture several aspects of
financial condition.
We chose the ratios used in the regression equations on
the basis of:
1. Relatively high correlation with slope
2. Signs as predicted
3. Relatively low correlation with other predictor
ratios.
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The models examined included the following ratios:
Return on equity
Current ratio or Quick ratio
Debt ratio or Current debt ratio
Investment to sales.
The best of the models attempted is presented here.
Slope .899 - .012X(l) - .045X(2) - .435X(3)
(.02) (.03) (.08) (.12)
where:
X(1) - return on assets
X(2) - quick ratio
X(3) - current debt ratio
Standard errors in parentheses
and the statistical results were:
adjusted R-squared = .33
F-value - 7.62
alpha (F) = .0004.
Two of the three independent variables did have
coefficients that matched signs with the predicted ones.
The coefficients for return on assets and current debt ratio I
matched the predicted signs, whereas the coefficient for
quick ratio did not.
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The results of these regressicns were disappointing in
that the maximum adjusted R-squared achieved was .33. This
showed that the transformation of data and the measuring of
change over time probably do not aid in the development of a
model for predicting price reduction curves.
J. SUMMARY
We attempted to develop a regression model that would
serve as a relatively reliable predictor for finding the
slopes of price reduction curves. We relied on univariate
correlation analysis, stepwise regression and the heuristic
selection of independent variables to develop a series of
potential models. In addition, we transformed the data set
in order to measure change from year to year.
We did find that the ratios representing financial
condition tend to correlate more frequently with price
reduction curve slope as the time to initial delivery
decreases. We also found that a significant amount of the
variation in price reduction curves could be explained
through the use of our better models.
The research did not provide a reliable predictive
model. The research did not strongly reinforce earlier
findings that a definite relationship exists between
financial condition and the slope of the price reduction
curve. While there was occasional evidence of significant
relationships between financial ratios and price reduction
slope&, those relationships were not consistently
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significant over time. Further research is required,
however, to develop a model to reliably predict the slope of
the price reduction curve.
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V. ANALYSIS OF ORGANIZATIONAL SLACK
AXD PRICING STABILITY
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter describes the statistical analysis
conducted and results of that analysis concerning the
relationship between organizational slack and the stability
of prices charged by contractors.
Based on the Bourgeois and Singh measurement framework
described in Chapt - II, 12 measures of organizational slack
were determined for each contracting firm for the six year
period prior to and including and year of delivery of the
first weapon system unit by the contractor. The measures nd
their presumed association with slack are in Table 8. The
R-squared of learning curves fit to prices charged over the
delivery period of each weapon system was used as a measure
of the stability of prices. Higher R-squared implies a
better fit of the learning curve to actual prices and
therefore a smoother or more stable price series. The
objective of the statistical analysis was to test for
associations between the slack measures and the R-squared of
the price curve. Correlation analysis was used. A comment
on notation is necessary: year 0 is the year in which
delivery of the first unit occurred. Year 1 is one year
prior to delivery. Year 2 is two years prior, etc.
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SYMBOL CALCULATION WITH SLACK
Available
Slack
PRO (Net Income-Dividends)/Sales +





WKC (Cui --.- Assets - Current
Liabilities)/Sales +
ACC All Receivables/Sales +
INIT Inventory/Sales +
GEN (Sales - Cols - Operating
Income)/Sales +
NCA Non-Current Assets/Sales +
Potential
Slack
CUR Current Liabilities/Stock Equity
LTD Long Term Liabilities/Stock Equity
TOT Total Liabilities/Stock Equity
INTC (Net Income + Interest Expense)/Interest
Expense +
PER Stock Price/Earnings Per Share +
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B. PRESENTATION OF ANALYSIS
The analysis was conducted in four parts.
(1) Correlations between R-squared and individual slack
variables measured at each year (5-0) of the test
period.
(2) Correlations between R-squared and average level of
slack measured over multiple years.
(3) Correlations between P.-squared and the year-to-year
change in slack measured between successive years of
the test period.
(4) Correlations between R-squared and cumulative change
in slack measured over multiple years.
In observing the results three issues were of concern:
(1) Hypothesized Signs: Was the direction of the
associations between slack and price stability (R-
squared) as hypothesized?
(2) gignificance: Were the correlations statistically
significant? (We adopted an alpha level of : .10 as
a threshold for significance.)
(3) C: Were the findings for variables
measured at different points consistent across the
six year test period?
1. Level of Slack/Individual years
First correlations between R-squared and the
individual slack variables were computed for the period 5-0.
The objective here was to determine if the amount of slack
in years prior to system delivery was associated with price
stability.
Results are in Table 9. Several broad conclusions
are evident from the table. First, only one correlation is
significant, so no strong association between slack and
price stability is evident from these tests. Second, the
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TABLE 9
LEVEL OF SLACK/INDIVIDUAL YEARS
Hyp. YearRatio 5da __ _.4_ 3i Z_ 1_ 0
PRO + -. 32 -. 16 -. 06 -. 19 -. 02 -. 04
QUI + +.09 -. 08 -. 01 +.17 +.13 +.02
QUU - -. 25 -. 20 -. 24 -. 19 -. 18 -. 14
WKC + -. 23 -. 22 -. 22 -. 20 -. 22 -. 20
ACC + -. 11 +.05 +.03 -. 14 +.10 +.10
INVT + +.07 +.19 +.15 +.11 +.10 +.10
GEN + +.12 +.02 -. 25 +.04 -. 02 -. 19
NCA + -. 03 +0.2 -. 14 -. 24 -. 28 -. 17
CUR - +.11 +.24 +.12 -. 08 +.02 +.14
LTD - -. 03 +.06 -. 26* -. 08 +.01 -. 02
TOT - +.08 +.25 +.05 -. 08 +.01 +.12
PER + -. 08 -. 16 -. 20 -. 01 -. 13 +.06
*Indicates correlation is significant, alpha < .10
signs of the correlation coefficients are- not generally as
hypothesized. Less than half of the correlations have the
correct sign. Third, there is little consistency in signs
across the different years. Only four slack measures (PRO,
QUU, WKC and INVT) have consistent signs for all six years.




2. Averaae Level of Slack/MultiDle Years
Step two consisted of correlations between R-squared
and the average level of slack over multiple years.
Averages over three different periods were computed:
5-0, 4-1 and 3-1
Average slack was computed as follows, utilizing year 5-0 as
an example:
Average Slack Level (5-0) - (VARO+VAR1+VAR2...VAR5/6)
The objective of this averaging process was to smooth out
year to year fluctuations in the slack measures to create
measures that would reflect the level of slack throughout
several years of the test period. These average slack
measures were then correlated with price stability (R-
squared).
Correlation results for measures averaged over the
4-1 period are in Table 10. (Results for the other two
periods were similar and are not reported.) There is small,
but noticeable, improvement. Two are significant, each with
the predicted sign. The overall findings do not, however,
provide particularly strong evidence for a relationship
between average level of slack and price stability.
3. Slack Chanae/Successiv2 Years
Next we computed the year to year change in slack
for successive years during the test period. The following
log measure was used:
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TABLE 10
AVERAGE LEVEL OF SLACK/MULTIPLE YEARS 4-1




WKC -. 01 +
ACC +.03. +
INVT -. 02 +
GEN -. 19 +






*Indicates correlation is significant at alpha 1 .10
Slack Change = ln(Variable year t/Variable year t-1)
This measure is positive (negative) for increases
(decreases) in a variable from one year to the next. The
objective here was to determine if increases in slack over
time are associated with price stability.
Results are in Table 11. Several broad conclusions





RATIO SIGN 5-4 4-3 3-2 2-1 1-0
PRO + +.21 +.14 -. 10 +.07 +.05
QUI + -. 05 +.03 +.21 -. 13 -. 20
QUU - +.21 -. 21 +.11 +.09 -. 02
WKC + +.20 +.02 -. 14 +.15 +.07
ACC + +.23* -. 03 -. 19 +.10 +.13
INVT + +.01 -. 01 -. 10 -. 14 -. 08
GEN + +.07 -. 27 -. 11 +.12 -. 11
NCA - -. 05 -. 14 -. 19 +.02 +.02
CUR - +.21 -. 16 -. 20 +.05 +.14
LTD - -. 02 -. 18 +.03 -. 08 +.21
TOT - +.35 -. 20 -. 16 +.01 +.17
PER + -. 15 +.24 +.16 +.15 -. 08
INT + +.22 +.15 +.09 -. 04 +.08
*Indicates correlation is significant, alpha 1 .10.
significant which again indicates no strong association
between slack and pricing stability. Second, the signs of
the correlation coefficients are not as hypothesized.
Finally, there is little consistency in signs across the
different years for the respectivp slack measures including
ACC, which was the one significant correlation.
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4. Cumulative Chance in Slack/Multiple Years
The final step was somewhat analogous to step 2. In
step 2 we investigated the average level of slack over
several years. Here, we investigated the average change in
slack, again over multiple year periods. Change in slack
for several years was calculated as follows (using the 4-1
period as an example).
Cumulative Change in
Slack (Variable 4-1) = Log(Variable ]/Variable 4)
Again, the objective was to smooth out year to year
variation in slack change with a measure that reflected a
cumulative change in slack. Again, these cumulative change
measures were correlated with the R-squared of the price
reduction slopes. Slack change was accumulated over various
multiyear periods. The correlations using measures for the
4-1 period are representative of the results and presented
in Table 12. The fiindings are not strongly supportive of
the hypotheses. Only 7 of 13 correlations have the
predicted signs. Only one correlation is significant (PER)
and it has sign opposite from that predicted.
C. SUMMARY OF RESULTS
In summary, we utilized 13 measures of organizational
slack for each contracting firm during the six year period.
Our objective was to test if a relationship existed between
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TABLE 12
CUMULATIVE SLACK CHANGE/MULTIPLE YEARS 4-1
RATIO CORRELATION HYPOTHESIZED SIGN
SLACK
PRO -. 17 +
QUI +. 05 +
QUU -. 23
WKC -. 24 +
ACC +.03 +
INVT +.2C +
GEN -. 01 +





PER -. 24* +
*Indicates correlation is significant at Alpha < .10.
the slack measures and the R-squared of the price reduction
curve.
The analysis was conducted in four parts. Each of these
tests included correlating the R-squared of the price
reduction curve and the following:
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1. Individual slack variables at each year
2. Average level of slack over the multiple years prior
to product introduction
3. The year to year change in slack measured between
"successive years
4. Cumulative change in slack measured over multiple
years prior to product introduction.
Our analysis showed little association between slack and
pricing stability in the first test. This was apparent from
the lack of significant correlation coefficients, the lack
of matched signs between the actual and hypothesized
correlation coefficients, and the inconsistency in the
actual signs across the different time periods.
The second test was conducted in order to see if the
averaging process would "smooth out" year to year
fluctuations. There was improvement, but our findings did
not provide strong evidence for a relationship between
average level of slack and price stability.
Our next step was to see if increases in slack over time
could be associated with price stability. Our results
showed that they were not. We reached this conclusion based
on the lack of significant correlations, the prevalence of
incorrect signs, and the inconsistency of signs throughout
the test period.
Finally, we measured a cumulative change in slack over
multiple years. Our objective was to smooth out the year to
year variation in slack change. Our findings were not
* strongly supportive of the hypotheses.
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• •In conclusion, little apparent association was found
between organizational slack and pricing stability.
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VI. SUMMARY. LIMITATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter will briefly summarize the various aspects
of the research involved in this study. Following the
summary, we will discuss the limitations of this research,
and make recommendations for future research.
B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
We began this research in order to address the following
questions:
1. Does an identifiable relationship exist between
financial condition and pricing strategy?
2. Does an identifiable relationship exist between
organizational slack (as measured using financial
data) and pricing stability?
In order to motivate the analysis, we provided a
background discussion of the following:
1. Financial condition and its elements
2. Pricing strategy
3. organizational slack and pricing stability.
We decided to restrict the sample data in use to the
aerospace industry. We did this based on the availability
of required financial and project data. We used data from
17 different companies and 52 different aircraft and missile
programs. The data were collected for the year of program
start and for the five preceding years.
79
We used the raw financial data to construct financial
ratios that describe the different aspects of financial
condition. we also used law financial data to construct
measures of organizational slack. Slopes and R-squared
values of learning curves fit to price data were used as
measures of pricing strategy and pricing stability,
respectively. We then performed a number of statistical
tests in order to determine if the hypothesized
relationships exist.
C. PRICING STRATEGY
First, a series of tests were performed to test the
relationship between financial condition and pricing
strategy. The following is a brief synopsis of the tests
performed:
1. Correlation analyses were performed between the
various financial ratios and the slopes of the price
reduction curves. These were done for all six years
studied.
2. Stepwise regressions were performed using slope as the
dependent variable and the various financial ratios as
the independent variables. This was done for year 3
only.
3. Several different linear regression models were
examined. Independent variables were heuristically
chosen on the basis of the signs of their related
correlation coefficients and the level of significance
of those same coefficients. This was only done for
year 3.
4. Correlation analyses were performed between the
measures of change (year to year) of the financial
ratios and the slopes of the price reduction curves.
This was done for all the periods of change.
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5. Stepwise regressions were performed using slope as the
dependent variable and the different measures of
change as the independent variables. This was done
for the periods of change 3-2 and 2-1.
6. Again, several different linear regression models were
constructed. Th- independent variables were again
chosen on the basis of the signs of their correlation
coefficients and the level of significant of those
same coefficients.
The results of the analysis for financial condition and
pricing strategy showed that correlations between financial
conditions and the slope of the price reduction curve
improved as time to initial product delivery decreased. We
also found that a significant amount of the variation in
price reduction curves could be explained through the use of
linear regression models. The results, however, did not
indicate that a consistent identifiable relationship exists
between financial condition and pricing strategy.
D. PRICE STABILITY
The tests concerning organizational sla.cK (as measured
using financial data) and pricing stability were conducted
in four parts. These utilized the 13 measures of
organizational slack described in Chapter V. These tests
included the following:
1. Correlation analysis between R-squared of the price
reduction curve and the individual measures of slack
at each year.
2. Correlation between the R-squared of the price




Next, the yenr to year change in slack was measured
between successive years. We then performed the following
tests:
3. Correlation analysis between R-squared of the price
reduction curve and the measures of year to year
change in slack in successive years.
4. Correlation analysis between R-squared of the price
reduction curve and the ., sures of cumulative change
in slack over multiple y .. s.
The tests regarding change in slack over multiple years
were conducted in order to see if the averaging process
would "smooth out" year to year fluctuations in the slack
measures.
The results of the analysis for organizational slack and
pricing stability showed no strong association between the
two. This was confirmed by the lack of hypothesized signs
for each period tested.. In addition, there were only a few
statistically significant ratios. Nearly half the
significant ratios had the incorrect hypothesized sign.
Finally, there was little consistency in the respective
variables' signs across the test period. In conclusion,
little apparent association was found between organizational
slac% and pricing stability.
E. LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH
1. Sample Selectin of Issues
The samnd"e population tor this research was based
solely on one t - of contra t (arerespace). Perhaps a
study utilizing c't-ractors f or )ttb. r ,reis w ;t:•d provide a
broader perspective and more conclusive results.
Specifically, one might look at non-major products within a
lower dollar value and shorter production period or possibly
other areas of the armed forces (ships, submarines, armored
vehicles, etc.).
Data taken for this study were collected over a long
period (35 years). Industry conditions vary from year to
year. This might make it inappropriate to compare ratios
from year to year. Further research may consider limiting
the test period to a smaller time period (5-10 years).
2. Measurement of Variables
The financial ratios utilized for representing
financial condition and organizational slack were
r-:nstructed using raw financial measures. Alternative
variables reflecting financial condition and organizational
slack might be measured relative to industry averages. This
might alter the conclusions reached in this study.
Our measures of organizational slack were based
strictly on the research of Bourgeois and Singh. This
measurement technique has not been fully validated and
therefore other means of measurement should be considered.
Perhaps the use of questionnaires, as suggested by Odell and
X(metz (Chapter II) *)r the method suggested by Gershenberg




Price "stability" was measured using the R-squared
of learning curves fit to prices charged over the del 'very
period of each weapons system. This can be considered a
rather crude measure. Future research could consider
alternative forms of stability measures such as using the
percent change in unit price for each year of the test
period.
3. Statistical Tests
It is important to note that we relied entirely on
linear correlation and regression methods in the course of
our research. It is quite possible that one or both of the
relationships examined are non-linear in nature.
In addition, all of the tests used were parametric.
This aspect of the testing required strong assumptions
concerning the distribution of the variables involved. Non-
parametric testing might very well have provided different
results.
F. CONCLUSION
in conclusioj, our analysis was no'c able to identify
consistent, significant relationships between financial
measures and either pricing strategy or price stability. In
the test of pricing strategy there was some indication that
financial ratios taken from the years immediately prior to
product delivery might be associated with pricing strategy,
but the fIndings were only suggestive. In the tests of
pricing stability, there was no convincing evidence of any
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relationship between organization slack and price stability.
It is possible that the relationships we attempted to
identify do not exist. It is also possible that consistent
relationships do exist but that our methodology failed to
identify them. We recommend that future research adopt
alternative approaches to investigating the research
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